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The Age of Unreason may become an Age of Greatness
-- Charles Handy, The Age of Unreason
INTRODUCTION
These days we frequently hear the term corporate culture. This
seems to imply that business has some form of cultural force;
but the history of business activity indicates that the relationship
between culture and business is one of reflection rather than
creation: business does not create or shape the surrounding
culture but rather reflects whatever culture prevails. From the
street vendors of ancient Babylon to today's multinational
corporation, the aspirations and attitiudes of those engaged in
business reflect the aspirations and attitudes of the prevailing
cultural milieu. Furthermore, the businesses that flourish at any
given time and in any given place are those that best reflect the
prevailing characteristics of the existing culture. Specifically, it
is the managers within these flourishing businesses who reflect
these characteristics.
For example, in a recent article in the Financial Times entitled
"More Top Shell Jobs For Women" (Tuesday, January 13, 1998,
p. 17), Robert Cozine notes the following: "Royal Dutch-Shell,
one of the world's largest oil companies, plans to shake up its
tradition-bound corporate culture by increasing the number of
women and range of nationalities in its top management tier".
The main reason for this shake up is that the "narrowness of
Shell's senior management base has been cited by critics as one
reason why it has struggled with rapid change in its business.
Critics point to the controversy over the scrapping of the Brent
Spar oil rig and Shell's problems with human rights in Nigeria.

They say a broader management base might have helped Shell
to respond more effectively to those issues" (currently only 4
percent of Shell's 400 senior managers are women). In short,
culture changes continually but Shell's culture in recent years
has not: its male Anglo management structure reflected the
cultural values of thirty years ago, but not the values of today.
The broad challenge of business management, therefore, is to
develop an ability to read and interpret these often subtle
cultural shifts, and to understand how these shifts impact the
role of business in society.
The central premise of this paper is that business reflects
culture. Building from this premise I address two basic
questions. First, what will be the prevailing culture of the
twenty-first century? Second, how is this culture going to be
reflected in the attitudes and aspirations of business
management? In answering the first question I identify the
dominant culture of the tweny-first century as that embraced by
the general label of postmodernism. Hence, in answering the
second question I label the manager of the twenty-first century
the postmodern manager. The primary characteristic of the
postmodern manager, which distinguishes this individual from
the modern manager, is the former's view of business as
primarily an indeterminate aesthetic activity, rather than the
characteristically modern view of business as a determinate
technical enterprise.
THE UNIVERSES OF BUSINESS
As a means of distinguishing the modern from the postmodern
manager, imagine three parallel business contexts or universes.
These contextual universes are identical except for the moral
orientation of the managers therein. In one universe managers
adhere precisely to the ontology of financial-economics: they
pursue personal material wealth maximization in a logical,
consistent, and unremitting fashion: they are homo economicus.
I term this universe the Technical Universe.
In the second universe managers are also instrumentally rational
in the sense that they apply logic and reason in the pursuit of
some goal. However their goal is not strictly personal material
wealth maximization. They are morally enlightened and thus
temper their personal material aspirations in deference to some
moral principle. They may, for example, substitute societal
material wealth maximization for personal wealth maximization,
or they may restrict their actions to those that will most benefit

the materially least advantaged, or they may act only on the
basis of universalizable moral principles such as some
conception of fairness or justice. These managers are still
rational in the sense that they apply logic and reason, and indeed
they may on occasion act in a way that is indistinguishable from
the managers in the Technical Universe. These moral managers,
however, because of their belief in some overiding moral
principle, cannot be relied upon to act in ways that are
predictable in financial-economic theory. This is not to say that
the behavior of these managers would not be predictable, once
their moral principles were made clear. Indeed the fact that these
managers still act in ways governed by logic and reason will
make their behavior as predictable as those managers who
comprise the Technical Universe. The essential difference,
therefore, between the technical managers and the moral
managers will be that the latter pursue goals and are subject to
constraints that may be more nuanced and ethereal than the
straightforward wealth-maximization goals of the technicians;
just as invocations of the technician can be found in financialeconomic theory, invocations of this moral manager can be
found in the dictates of business-ethics theory. I term this
second universe the Moral Universe.
The third and final universe that I wish to conjure is the most
opaque. It is a universe that we in modernity are least familiar
with because the actions of managers therein are not governed
by notions of scientific logic or instrumental rationality.
Managers in this universe recognise the need for material profit,
and they are cognisant of the conventional rules and logic of the
Moral Universe, however they do not view these reason-based
enterprises as ultimate objectives. These, what I call 'aesthetic'
managers pursue a goal that is hard to define in modern English.
Indeed to even call it a goal may be missleading, for these
managers recognise their universe as essentially one of chaotic
dissorder and unpredictability where rules of logic and
rationality will never fit comfortably. These managers endeavor
to achieve some sort of aesthetic balance and harmony in their
chaotic environment. In this endeavor they are assisted by
certain conceptions of the good life, and by conceptions of
desirable character traits that may lead to this good life. The
acquisition of these character traits and the concomitant pursuit
of the good life is not achieved simply by the application of
certain rules of logic, or of rationality. Indeed the whole pursuit
is characterized by a marked absence of rules and set goals. It is,
to all intents and purposes, an aesthetic pursuit. At one time a
manager's actions may be governed by economic interest, but at

other times it may be governed by compassion, or courage, or a
conception of the beautiful or harmonious. Thus unlike the
previous two universes, the managers in this universe exhibit
more complex and multifariuos behavioral patterns. Their goal
is not easily defined, if indeed it can be viewed in terms of a
singular goal, and the means by which they pursue this elusive
goal are not easily categorized either. In essence their behavior
lies outside conventional logic or rationality. They pursue a type
of aesthetic truth or beauty. Or, to put it another way, they
pursue a point in their lives where the truth and beauty
converge. I term this universe the Aesthetic Universe.
My essential thesis in this article is that business management
exists and has always existed in all three of these universes.
Every business manager is and has always been to a greater or
lesser degree a technician, a moralist, and an aesthete. What has
varied over time and between place is the extent to which one or
more of these universes dominates the others. The dominance of
any one of these three universes is generally determined by the
encompassing cultural milieu. Crises in business management
generally develop when the universe in which management
believes it resides conflicts with that of the surrounding society.
To a large degree, therefore, successful management entails the
ability to perceive and predict the prevailing cultural conception
of business. In short, business reflects culture. As Jean Staune
observes: "The vision of the world and the vision of mankind
which prevail in a society have a determining influence on
social and economic organization" (1996, p. 145).
As we enter the twenty-first century, a Western corporate
culture is becoming ever more geographically omnipresent. At
the same time, however, the epistemological bedrock of this
culture is crumbling. From its inception in the reformation and
rennaisance, Western corporate culture has been the child of the
age of reason. All the facets of modern business -- economics,
rule-based or consequence-based ethics, science, technology -are products of this reason-based instrumental rationality. The
foundation of modern business is reason. But Western corporate
culture itself, as with any culture, evolves and changes. In
attempting to respond to this evolution and change, managers
are continually confronted with the limitations of any fixed
notion of reason; rationality itself evolves and shifts definitional
emphasis between the Technical, Moral, and Aesthetic
Universes. For example, when senior management at Royal
Dutch Shell recently decided to establish a division within the
company whose sole purpose was to monitor environmental and

human-rights issues, this was a response to a broader cultural
shift. This decision by Shell's management was no doubt
financially justifiable given Shell's recent public relations
dissasters concerning -- in the case of the environment -- its
decision to dump an obsolete oil platform in the mid-Atlantic; a
decision that was reversed in the wake of public outrage. And in
the case of human rights, Shell suffered and is still suffering
negative publicity for its tacit support of the opressive regime in
the north African country of Nigeria: a country in which Shell
has a substantial oil interest. So, given the above public relations
dissasters and the concomitant economic cost, Shell's decision
clearly exists within the Technical Universe of financial
rationality. But it does not exist entirely within this single
universe. Shell's recent concern for the environment and human
rights also reflects a broader cultural shift into the Moral and
Aesthetic Universes. Shell's management is forced to recognise
that -- as with all modern multinationals -- this massive oil
company can no longer be run as a purely economic enterprise;
it must, to some extent at least, be run as a moral and aesthetic
enterprise also. Indeed, the much better public relations image
of, for example, British Petroleum, is a direct result of BP's
early recognition of this broader socio-cultural shift: BP's
operations in Columbia are as potentially sensitive, in terms of
human rights, as Shell's in Nigeria, but unlike Shell, BP's
management has from the outset been careful to distance itself
from the morally-questionable Columbian national government.
Returning to Shell, its most recent oil drilling activities in the
jungles of Peru is apparently the very model of environmental
and cultural sensitivity: rather than cutting a road through the
jungle to its oil installations, Shell is, at great expense, flying in
and out all supplies. Thus there is no simple formula, either
financial or moral, for these oil giants: this once again reflects
the essentially aesthetic nature of tenty-first century postmodern
management.
In the soft-drinks industry, PepsiCo has recently suffered a
public relations disaster that resulted in it severing all ties with
Burma, a country currently controlled by a military junta.
Pepsi's interests in Burma were no doubt financially justifiable
initially, but Pepsi failed to realize that financial justifiability is
not sufficient in today's cultural milieu. More specifically, Pepsi
failed to realize that financial justification is itself a function of
pricing factors -- such as human rights -- that by no means lend
themselves easily to incorporation into a financial analysis.
Nike, the athletic apparel manufacturer, is having similar

experiences with its (economically rational) policy of targeting
certain developing countries as locations for shoe assembly. In
essence, Pepsi, Shell, and Nike tried to remain predominantly
economic institutions within a culture that increasingly finds
acceptable only predominantly moral and aesthetic institutions
vis-a-vis the Moral and Aesthetic Universes.
The recent experiences of these multinationals are not unusual.
In fact, as any perusal of a business newspaper will reveal, they
are typical. We in Western corporate culture are in the midst of
a shift in the metaphysical universe of business: we are
experiencing an epistemological crisis, a paradigm shift in our
conception of ratioanlity and reason in business enterprise. More
precisely, we in the West are becoming increasingly unsure of
the exact nature of reason. Whose reason? What is the reason
behind reason? These are questions that would have had little
relevance to nineteenth-century industrialists. Their monocultural, protestant-ethic, encyclopaedic bedrock was solid.
Twenty-first century business culture, however, is characterized,
not by Victorian self-confidence, but by radical self-questioning.
Indeed, in contrast to the recent epochs of the age of reason and
of self-confidence, the West of the next millenium promises to
be an age of self-doubt and self-questioning. Staune sums up
this transition by noting that:
one of the great events of the end of the twentieth century is
that, in all the disciplines of science, a new vision is emerging.
Behind the study of the foundations of matter, the origin of the
universe, behind the experiments studying how man's
consciousness works, behind the playing out of the evolution of
life appears a certain depth to reality. One can scientifically
show that 'what is' cannot be reduced to an objective, material
and measurable level. [1996, p. 146]
In the broader cultural milieu this approach of the age of selfquestioning and self-doubt is reflected in the philosophy and
sociology of poststructuralism and postmodernism. These
philosophies challenge the bedrock of modernity by
deconstructing many of the constructs upon which modernism is
built: constructs such as truth, reason, and logic. Although
coming to prominance in the late twentieth century,
postmodernism gained much of its impetus from the writings of
Freidrich Nietzsche in the nineteenth century. Nietzsche
challenged the assumed certainties of his era by arguing that
there is no absolute truth or absolute moral good. Concepts such
as truth and good are merely weapons used by society and

individuals in their continual will to power: "This world is the
will to power -- and nothing besides! And you yourselves are
also this will to power -- and nothing besides!" (WP, 1967). For
Nietzsche, at least in his earlier writings, the only absolute was
this will to power, although -- in true postmodernist fashion -Nietzsche is equivocal even about this. For example, in his
analysis of Nietzschian morality, Brian Leiter states: "I doubt
whether a good argument can even be made out that 'will to
power' provides Nietzsche with his standard of value" (1997, p.
267, footnote 40). Leiter suggests that Nietzsche criticizes the
universal application of everyday moral dictums on the grounds
that such application will stifle those few individuals capable of
real creativity and excellence. Thus Nietzsche does not construct
some alternative value system but merely deconstructs the
modern notion of universal everyday morality. In essence,
therefore, Nietzsche's universal moral principle is that there is
no universal moral principle: true morality is an absence of
morality; a quintessentially postmodern stance. Nietzsche's
critique of the assumed self-evident truths of modernism
augered our current age of radical uncertainty. Indeed, the
essence of Neitzsche's critique of modernity is reflected in the
writings of all contemporary postmodernists. For example, the
title of Alasdair MacIntyre's 1988 book really says it all: Whose
Justice? Which Rationality?.
Returning to our three business universes. The first two, those of
the technical and moral, were products of reason. They reflect
modernity as defined by the Enlightenment economic and moral
philosophers, most notably Adam Smith in his two masterworks The Theory of Moral Sentimants (1759), and, An Enquiry
Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776).
These works presaged and explained the industrial revolution
and the rise of capitalism as economic expressions of the
modernist principles of prudent reason and instrumental
rationality. Smith saw no inherent conflict between what I have
termed here the Moral and Technical universes. For him both
were complimentary facets of the modernist metaphysic.
Business may have existed comfortably in these two universes
in the last two centuries; business of the twenty-first century
will, however, no longer reside in these universes. The coming
age of self-doubt will necessitate business moving to a different
universe, a postmodern universe. Management will have to
make this shift also. It will be a shift in management paradigm.
The management universe of the tweny-first century will be
neither a technical universe nor a moral universe, indeed it will

be no reason-based universe. The dominant business culture will
be a rekindling of a culture of business that was all but entirely
eclipsed in the industrial revolution. In the age beyond reason, in
the epoch of self-doubt, the manager will become the
postmodern aesthete.
For the first time since the inception of modernity, that is for the
first time in some three-hundred years in the West, the manageras-aesthete will dominate. So, for example, Pepsi's management
realized finally that their decision to pull out of Burma in
January of 1997 could not be successfully made by applying
financial theory, or by applying some moral dictum, it could
only be made aesthetically; in having to make a decision not
based on either financial theory or moral theory, Pepsi's
management were forced into the postmodern world. But why
exactly did the Technical and Moral Universes prove ineffectual
for Pepsi in making this decision?
A BRIEF DECONSTRUCTION OF THE TECHNICAL
UNIVERSE
With the possible exception of the latter third of the twentieth
century, when the moral manager has gained prominance, the
dominant management paradigm of modernity has undoubtedly
been the manager as technician. This manager as technician
exists within the metaphysic of what I term here the Technical
Universe. This Technical Universe finds its justification in the
theory and empirics of financial-economic theory. Indeed this
manager as technician is purely the practical manifestation of
the theoretically rational agent of financial economics: the
wealth maximizer, the opportunist, the logician. But who
exactly is this person? We must never lose sight of the fact that
the manager is a person. So what type of person is the rational
agent of financial-economic theory?
A priori, we might reasonably expect that if nothing else at least
this agent will be profoundly rational, where rationality would
be defined in an instrumental, that is to say modernist, sense.
Instrumental rationality is what designates the manager as
technician, it is the essence of financial-economic theory, so
surely the rational pursuit of rational objectives will characterize
this person. But does it?
When we look closely at this manager as technician. When we
deconstruct this construction of financial-economic theory we
find something that is unexpected. This rational agent, who has

the rational objective of personal material advancement, never
actually achieves this objective. Indeed, more significantly, it is
the very nature of the rationality adopted that ensures that this
rational agent can never rationally achieve his or her rational
objective (Dobson, 1996).
Thus, in short, financial-economic theory makes the odd
assumption that rational agents rationally choose a rationality
construct that ensures that they can never rationally achieve the
rationally determined objective. Simply put, the goal of wealth
maximization or some variant thereof, as conjured by financialeconomic theory, and as adopted by our manager-as-technician,
is subtly self-defeating. This pursuit of wealth maximization
never achieves maximum wealth either for the individual agent
or for the group of agents who comprise the Technical Universe.
Elsewhere I have termed this phenomenon the finance paradox,
for it is indeed paradoxical that a rational individual or group of
individuals would knowingly adopt a mode of reasoning and
behavior -- namely opportunism -- that they rationally know will
render them incapable of achieving their a priori stated
objective: to maximize their material wealth or, if they are riskaverse or effort-averse, their utility of wealth.
Furthermore, financial-economic theory in the guise of the
technician has always claimed that this opportunistic pursuit of
wealth together with the firm-wide implication of it, namely
shareholder-wealth maximization, is value neutral. By 'value'
here is meant moral value: financial economics has always had a
self-conception as a moral-free-zone, exempt from the vagueries
of moral philosophy. The careful deconstruction undertaken
below, however, will reveal that financial-economic theory is
not value free. It possesses an implicit moral agenda.
In the case of individual opportunism, financial economics
defends its theories as morally free by either just tacitly
accepting opportunism as a simplifying assumption (real
behavior is too complex to model), or as just tacitly accepting
such behavior as natural (a sort of tacit application of some
variant of social Darwinism). In the case of the first justification,
it is noteworthy that this acceptance of opportunism as a
simplifying assumption is made purely on the basis of the
latter's mathematical convenience. The mathematical
modalability of behavior is taken as a primary criterion for
building a model of the manager. In the context of human
behavior, 'mathematical', and 'model building' are all

characteristics peculiar to modernity.
Thus a managerial universe of pure technicians, where a pure
technician is an agent who adheres strictly to the tenets of
financial-economic rationality, will be characterized by
economic inefficiency and instability in the short-run and likely
self-destruction in the long-run. More significantly, these are not
merely the predictions of a postmodern critique. These are the
predictions of financial-economic theory itself!
A BRIEF DECONSTRUCTING THE MORAL UNIVERSE
Consider perhaps the most comprehensive and widely accepted
business-ethics theory yet developed, namely Integrated Social
Contracts Theory (ISCT). Donaldson and Dunfee desribe ISCT
as a "realistic, comprehensive, and global normative theory of
business ethics .." (1991, p. 32). The theory claims to establish
certain hypernorms that provide a moral foundation for business
throughout the world. Essentially these hypernorms all center
around what we in the West call 'human rights'. In addition to
the hypernorms, ISCT attempts to preempt any charge of
Western cultural imperialism by recognising the existance of
culturally distinct mini-norms. These mini-norms, however,
according to ISCT are always subject to justification in terms of
the hypernorms.
Clearly, if it is to possess any normative bight, ISCT needs the
hypernorms to be omnipotent. Otherwise, with a multiplicity of
contradictory and culturally distinct mini-norms, the theory
would just descend into ethical relativism. But does ISCT live
up to its claims? Does it provide a normative foundation for a
global business ethic? Or does it merely project the prejudices of
Western modernity?
Surely human rights, however desirable we in the West may feel
them to be, are a peculiarly Western and more specifically a
peculiarly 'modernist' phenomenon. Human rights are an
invention of Enlightenment moral philosophy. To claim human
rights such as personal freedom, informed consent, and
ownership of property, as universal and unequivocal
hypernorms is to claim that Enlightenment moral philosophy
(whatever exactly that is) has some absolute justification, that it
is the Truth, the absolute presence. MacIntyre, for example,
observes "there are no such rights, and belief in them is one with
belief in witches and in unicorns" (1984, p. 69). He goes on to

explain this position:
The best reason for asserting so bluntly that there are no such
rights is indeed of precisely the same type as the best reason
which we possess for asserting that there are no witches and the
best reason which we possess for asserting that there are no
unicorns: every attempt to give good reasons for believing that
there are such rights has failed. The eighteenth-century
philosophical defenders of natural rights sometimes suggest that
the assertions which state that men possess them are self-evident
truths; but we know that there are no self-evident truths.
Twentieth-century moral philosophers have sometimes appealed
to their and our intuitions; but one of the things that we ought to
have learned from the history of moral philosophy is that the
introduction of the word 'intuition' by a moral philosopher is
always a signal that something has gone badly wrong with an
argument. [Ibid.]
In his recent business-ethics text, David Fritszche states that
"there are certain practices (hypernorms) such as stealing,
killing, and slavery which are not condoned by any community
worldwide" (1997, p. 55). Really? I am not familiar with every
community worldwide, but I am familiar with my own Western
community, and I could argue that -- given reasonable
definitions of "stealing", "killing", and "slavery" -- all of these
are condoned in my community. For example, ask a native
American whether the West condones stealing. Ask a
Palestinian, an Iraqi, or even perhaps an African-American
whether the West condones killing. Ask the animal rights
activists who have compiled a declaration of primate rights
whether the West condones slavery.
In reality, ISCT, like business-ethics-theory in general, suffers
from all the internal inconsistencies and incoherences
characteristic of modernity. Simply put, there is no such thing as
a hypernorm. Ethics is always contextual. As Paul Buller, John
Kohls, and Kenneth Anderson note in their recent article on
Cross-Cultural Ethical Conflicts; "a number of recent empirical
studies provide evidence for different ethical perspectives across
national cultures on a wide variety of specific issues" (1997, p.
173). They go on to give numerous examples of such studies.
They conclude:
the preponderance of the research to date suggests strongly that
different national cultures have different perspectives regarding
ethical values and norms. ..national culture plays a central role

in shaping moral values and standards of ethical behavior.
Strong cross-cultural differences make it difficult to develop
universal moral values, reasoning, and behaviors that will be
meaningful and adhered to across national boundaries. [1987,
pp. 173-174]
The notion of a hypernorm erroneously assumes that the
Western modernist context is 'the' context. In addition, the
internal inconsistencies in the theory become apparent when
attemptrs are made to apply it. For example, consider a recent
attempt to apply it by David Fritszche. Fritszche considers the
example of a Western firm doing business in China. Initially he
notes that "nepotism might be a micro social contract norm in an
Asian community. Equal opportunity may be a norm in a
Western community" (p. 45). But then of course would not
nepotism (or at least the Western definition of it) contradict our
human-rights induced hypernorm? Later in his discussion of
ISCT Fritszche states: "Once the [Western] firm has landed a
contract and begins hiring Chinese employees, it should observe
equal opportunity norms (the norms of its local [Western]
community that do not have an adverse effect on the Chinese) in
its hiring practices" (p. 46). But wait a minute, did we not just
decide that nepotism was a moral norm in China? So by
adopting Western hiring practices are we not guilty of precicely
the moral imperialism that ISCT was supposed to avoid? We are
in essence saying that our Western hiring practices are in some
absolute moral sense superior to your Eastern hiring practices,
which once again broaches the question of from whence this
absolute moral 'ought' of Western modernity is derived. For
example, in the case of bribery, Valesquez and Brady note that
"moral views on bribery appear to be culturally conditioned, and
in some cultures the absolutist view of the wrongness of bribery
is perceived as a form of Western cultural imperialism that is
deeply ethnocentric" (1997, p. 100). Not surprisingly, given its
existance entirely within the context of modernity, ISCT has no
answer to this question of justifying the 'ought' of modern
morality. Indeed its conceptual contextlessness precludes it from
even realizing this as a meaningful question.
For example, Donaldson states that "[c]orporations ... exist to
enhance the welfare of society" (1982, p. 54). But Donaldson
fails to give a precise definition of this "welfare"; he goes on to
say "through the satisfaction of consumer and worker interests"
(ibid.), but what interests exactly, and might these intersts not
have been created by the corporation in the first place through
advertising? Which brings us back to the question of how our

modern manager is going to act so as to maximize overall
welfare? Who and what is included in overall? What is welfare?
So, in short, somewhere along the line, before he takes any act,
our modernist, utilitarian, societal-welfare-maximizing manager
is just going to have to apply some absolute ought. But from
whence is the justification for this 'ought' going to come? In
Against the Self-Images of the Age MacIntyre notes that in
classical Greek, Latin, and Anglo-Saxon and Middle English,
the words 'ought' and 'owe' are indistinguishable. The 'ought' of
the Moral Universe is a type of taboo, or what MacIntyre calls a
survival:
We make a social practice intelligible by placing it in some
context where the point and purpose of doing things in one way
rather than another is exhibited by showing the connection
between that social practice and some wider institutional
arrangements of which it is a part. So the passing of a verdict
has to be understood in the context of a legal system, and the
concept of a home run has to be understood in the context of
baseball. When we cannot make a practice intelligible by
providing such a context, there are two possibilities. The first is
that we have not been adequately perceptive or understanding in
our investigation of that particular social order; the other is that
the practice just is, as it stands, unintelligible. One hypothesis
which we may advance as a result of coming to the latter
conclusion, a hypothesis which has the additional merit, if it is
independently supported, of supporting the latter conclusion, is
that the practice in question is a survival. That is to say, we
explain the practice in its present form by supposing that it is the
historical product of an earlier practice which existed in a social
context that has now been removed and of the consequnces of
the removal of that context. What do I mean by a context? A set
of beliefs expressed in institutionalized social practice. Hence
what I want to maintain is that the use of the ... moral "ought"
can perhaps only be made intelligible as a social practice by
supposing it to be a survival from a lost context of beliefs, just
as the eighteenth-century Polynesian use of "taboo" can perhaps
only be made intelligible by supposing it to be a survival from a
lost context of beliefs. [1984a, p. 167]
Indeed even within the Nineteenth century itself this central
fallibility of the Enlightenemnt 'ought' was recognized, most
notably by Nietzsche. To illustrate this point in a contemporary
business context, consider the following example. A skillful
financial accountant may be able to enhance her company's

reported results of operations by crafting a sale-leaseback
arrangement whereby some of the company's assets are sold, a
gain is recorded, all the appropriate accounting pronouncements
are adhered to, and the company still has use of its assets. The
intent of the transaction was never to rid the company of
unwanted assets, but rather to record a gain and thus possibly
avoid breaching debt-covenant agreements or circumvent
regulatory requirements. A recent example of a major
corporation adopting this practice is IBM during its financial
crisis of the early 1990s. IBM attempted to artificially bolster its
financial statements by undertaking major sale and leaseback
arrangements. It rapidly dropped the practice in the face of
critical public scrutiny.
In order to examine whether or not this example of creative
accounting is unethical, traditional approaches would have the
individual step out of her accounting role and don the hat of a
Kantian (e.g., "does this action violate the rights of users of the
financial statements to fairly presented financial information?"),
or of a utilitarian (e.g., "does this action maximize the welfare of
all stakeholders?"). In this traditional approach, therefore, a
professional - whether accountant or otherwise - adopts a type of
moral schizophrenia in which being a good professional in the
sense of being an economically effective accountant becomes
separable from being a good professional in the sense of being
an ethical accountant. Thus, an accountant could be a 'good'
accountant, in the sense of being very efficient and effective, yet
at the same time not be a 'good' accountant, in the sense of being
ethical.
Similarly, statements such as "You 'ought' to be an ethical
accountant!" become problematic. Clearly, given the
aforementioned separation of ethics and efficiency, such a
command of 'ought' cannot be premised on the idea that being
an ethical accountant will in some way engender greater
efficiency. If one were to challenge this command with the
question, "Why 'ought' I to be an ethical accountant?", the
modernist approach to ethics would have trouble providing a
simple answer beyond "You ought to be an ethical accountant
because being ethical is what accountants ought to be", which
clearly does not really answer the original question. Given this
dual concept of the 'good' professional, therefore, it is not
surprising that many practitioners feel confused. They may find
themselves being simultaneously tugged in two opposing
directions: in the direction of economic efficiency or profit
maximization, and in the direction of adherence to some abstract

professional code of conduct; some abstract 'ought' of the Moral
Universe.
A BRIEF CONSTRUCTION OF THE AESTHETIC
UNIVERSE
To find the postmodern manager we must in fact seek out the
premodern manager. I use the term 'artisan' to label the manager
as aesthete; this is a premodern term and it labels a certain type
of individual. An artisan is an individual engaged in business,
but the individual's conception of business, and in particular the
individual's conception of the Good of business, is very different
to that of the modern manager.
The artisan views business as an art or craft in which the
primary pursuit is of a certain type of excellence. The goal is not
material gain or adherence to some rationality-founded moral
dogma. Indeed, as the term 'art' implies, the postmodern
manager pursues primarily nothing that is materially measurable
or empirically observable. That is not to say that this pursuit is
non-moral, for this excellence is also The Good. This pursuit
may also be characterized by the generation of substantial
material wealth. But neither morality nor material wealth define
this excellence or Good. So what exactly is it?
I mentioned that to find the postmodern manager empirically we
must look to the premodern manager; and indeed it is in the
metaphysics of the premoderns that a definition of our
Excellence or Good can be found. Fortunately for our purposes
this premodern metaphysic has been made more
comprehendable to us moderns by the resurgence of classical
Greek philosophy in the latter half of the twentieth century. This
resurgence is undoubtedly due in no small measure to the
epistemological crises of modernity described above; the
resurgence generally comes under the nomenclature of 'virtue
ethics'.
So to describe the essence of the manager of the postmodern era
we look to the managers, cratsmen, and artisans of the
premodern era; so we return again to a pre-industrial, prefactory, village-based business concept, albeit one based today
on remote-access computer technology rather than the potter's
wheel or spinning loom. The postmodern manager may work
with different tools than the premodern, but the essential view of
human activity as an artistic pursuit or craft, as an excellence,
will be rekindled in the postmodern business era. Virtue ethics

theory represents an avenue by which to make this transition
from modernism to postmodernism in a business context (see
Solomon, 1992). Virtue ethics theory can thus be viewed as a
type of translation mechanism.
One defining characteristic of the postmodern manager,
emphasized particularly in virtue ethics theory, is an holistic
approach to decisionmaking. In modernist approaches, the
economic and the moral are seen as entirely seperable. A
manager can make, for example a capital budgeting decision,
either on the basis of economic criteria such as the net-presentvalue (NPV), or on the basis of moral criteria such as integratedsocial-contracts-theory (ISCT). But these two methods are
entirely epistemologically seperate; there is a dualism here so
familiar to modernity. The internal crises in the Universes of the
technician and the moralist are reflected in the deconstructions
of the ontological foundations of these concepts as intellectual
modes of enquiry; specifically what is being deconstructed are
those prejudices and illusions that defined the dualism between
the economic notion of the manager-as-technician and the
modern philosophical notion of the manager-as-moralist. The
postmodern critique reveals these two heretofore seperate
ontologies as just two fragile and contextual metaphysical
stances. This realization within the academic cloisters of
economics and ethics is leading first to radical self-doubt, and
second to radical re-orientation among -- in the current context - business management theorists and practitioners. In essence
what financial economics and moral philosophy are
experiencing are paradigm shifts. Interestingly, the nature of
these paradigm shifts are not dissimilar in that they both reflect
a conceptual broadening unfamiliar to modernism -characterized as modernism is by identification and
compartmentalization -- but very familier to postmodernism in
general and virute-ethics theory in particular.
Undoubtedly my invocation of this manager-as-aesthete
highlights the limitations of the manager-as-technician. But it in
no way discredits the application of finance theory to business
providing that the limitations of the latter are recognised. Capital
budgeting methods such as the net-present-value rule, although
analytically rigourous, are in no way antithetical to our
postmodern manager. This manager-as-aesthete will still employ
capital budgeting and other technical methods, but will view
these as just one means of making a decision: decisions such as
Pepsi's concerning Burma, or Shell's concerning its activities in
Nigeria. The postmodern manager will recognize the aesthetic

value judgements that underlie the analytics of capital
budgeting: judgements such as the time frame assumed, the
assumptions underlying cash-flow estimates and discount-rate
estimates, the assumptions of time-value-of-money and
reinvestment inherent in this type of analysis. All these will be
recognised by the postmodern manager as forming the context
of the analysis, and this context will be taken as just one
possible context from which to make a decision.
So the postmodern manager's prerogative, albeit complex and
multi-faceted, is in no way a purely chaotic, unstructured, and
futile one; this manager is just no longer labouring under the
illusion that decisions can be made correctly purely on the basis
of technical or moral criteria. In pursuing these ellusive internal
goods of the Aesthetic Universe, the postmodern manager
recognizes the need to excercise judgement in weighing the
many considerations -- economic, moral, and aesthetic -- that go
into sound decisionmaking. More precisely, the postmodern
manager merely realizes that any desision criterion, even
something as apparently cut-and-dry as the net-peresent-value
rule, is in reality at root just another aesthetic context from
which to view the art of business.
CONCLUSION
In concluding their seminal work on the theory of the firm,
Jensen and Meckling note that "whatever its shortcomings, the
corporation has thus far survived the market test against
potential alternatives" (1976, p. 357). This statement has since
been further vindicated by recent developments in eastern
Europe and the republics that once comprised the Soviet Union.
We exit the twentieth century with the market system
increasingly omnipresent, auguring a global corporate culture.
Thus when viewed within the Technical Universe, the story of
the firm-as-competitive-enterprise is undoubtedly a story of
success. From the aesthetic perspective, however, there are other
universes or contexts. Success in the technical universe is
merely a prerequisite for entry into the aesthetic universe. This
aesthetic context is, according to Aristotle, obscured by the
technical paradigm where excellence is equated with efficiency
in achieving solely material ends. The latter is a paradigm that is
oblivious to the intrinsic value of the aesthetic universe: in
economic-game-theory for example there is no virtue, no
internal good, no craftsmanship or excellence save in the name
of effectiveness, no communal purpose. In the competitive game
of economic self-interest, truth and good become subservient to

profit. Individuals -- and even ostensibly non-economic
institutuions such as universities -- shift their allegiance, from
truth and good, to profit:
In the Republic, Plato implicitly and explicitly argues that
materialism is the source of many of our moral ills. If one's
value system is essentially materialistic, it encourages us to
cheat, lie, steal, and the like, for if we can get away with such
actions, we will be materialistically better off. [Klein, 1989, p.
62]
When Aristotle described life's ideal as one of intellectual
pursuit or contemplative enquiry, he accepted that the material
wealth of his society was sufficient for only a small fraction of
its inhabitants to realize this ideal. In the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, wealth generated by the firm through the
market system has freed the majority of humanity from the
fetters of material servitude. But the victory has been Pyrrhic.
To the extent that the aesthetic universe has been eclipsed in
modernity by the game-theoretic technical universe, the fetters
of material servitude have merely been replaced by those of
aesthetic impoverishment. The tragedy of modern corporate
culture is thus the tragedy of King Midas. In creating the means
for unlimited material acquisition, we may have prevented
ourselves from acquiring those non-material goods that we most
desire.
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